Prevention and treatment strategies for contextual overgeneralization by Sevenster, Dieuwke et al.
1SCiEntifiC REPORtS | 7: 16967  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-16893-2
www.nature.com/scientificreports
Prevention and treatment 
strategies for contextual 
overgeneralization
Dieuwke Sevenster1,2,3, Kim Haesen4, Bram Vervliet2,5, Merel Kindt6,7 & Rudi D’Hooge1
At the core of anxiety disorders lies the tendency to generalize fear from a threatening to a safe 
situation. A deeper understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate and restrain generalization in 
humans is therefore needed. Rodent studies showed that pre-exposure to a context that is similar to 
the threatening context enhanced generalization to the similar context. In Experiment 1 we replicated 
these animal findings in humans (US-expectancy). Studies on the underlying mechanisms showed 
that the pre-exposure representation was recalled during conditioning (due to similarity between 
the contexts) and the shock also became linked to the recalled representation, resulting in greater 
generalization. In Experiment 2 we developed a pre-exposure procedure that increased the ability 
to distinguish between the conditioned and pre-exposure contexts, such that presentation of the 
former would no longer result in recall of the latter. We then observed that overgeneralization (US-
expectancy) was prevented. Pre-exposure did not affect generalization of skin conductance response 
or fear potentiated startle. Finally, exploratory analyses revealed that increased generalization (US-
expectancy), if not prevented, could be reduced by a reminder of the conditioned context. Hence, we 
developed a prevention- and a treatment-strategy for overgeneralization. These findings may guide the 
development of new therapeutic strategies.
Generalization of fear is a defining feature in the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders1–3. Following a trau-
matic event (e.g., being robbed in a dark ally), an individual comes to regard a situation that is actually safe but 
related to the threatening experience (e.g., all dark streets) as potentially harmful. Unrestricted fear generalization 
can seriously impair social functioning and quality of life (e.g., never leave the house after dark). A better under-
standing of the mechanisms underlying fear generalization could stimulate the development of new strategies to 
curb generalization.
Basic neuroscience studies demonstrated that neutral or non-threatening experiences before fear learning 
could heavily influence subsequent fear generalization; one day before conditioning in context A, rodents were 
pre-exposed to a context that was similar (context B) to the threatening context (context A), resulting in increased 
generalization to that previously neutral context4–6. It is important to note that pre-exposure did not necessarily 
result in overgeneralization; it did not occur when animals were pre-exposed to a context that was completely 
different from the conditioned context, suggesting that similarity between contexts is crucial4–6. So far it has not 
been demonstrated that overgeneralization through context pre-exposure can also be observed in humans. In 
the first experiment we will investigate whether pre-exposure to a similar context enhances generalization at test.
The phenomenon of pattern completion is crucial to understand pre-exposure-induced overgeneralization. 
Pattern completion refers to the ability to recall a memory representation with a partial cue7,8. In general, pres-
entation of a context that shares features with a previously presented context results in recall of that context. 
More specifically, exposure to the conditioned context triggered recall of the similar pre-exposure context, due to 
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the overlap in features between contexts. The representation of the pre-exposure context was thus active during 
conditioning, resulting in a link between the recalled pre-exposure context and shock. This link between the 
pre-exposure context and the shock resulted in increased generalization to the similar contexts at test. Crucially, 
prevention of recall of the neutral pre-exposure context during conditioning would eliminate overgeneraliza-
tion all together. Here, we aimed to demonstrate that pre-exposure- induced overgeneralization could be pre-
vented by manipulating the pre-exposure session. (Note that studies have been conducted that also made use of 
pre-exposure techniques to reduced generalization9. These studies aimed to reduce over generalization as a result 
of the passage of time. But here we specifically aimed to design a technique that prevents the overgeneralization 
induced by pre-exposure to a similar context).
Perceptual learning research may offer such a preventive strategy. There is an abundance of evidence show-
ing that pre-exposure to a pair of similar stimuli increases the ability to discriminate between those stimuli10–12. 
Subjects were exposed to the common features twice as often as to the unique elements of the stimuli. The com-
mon elements became less salient while the unique elements became more distinct. In agreement, pre-exposure 
to two similar contexts will result in the increased ability to discriminate between the unique features of similar 
contexts. Then, presentation of the conditioned context will result in discrimination rather than recall of the sim-
ilar context. We investigated whether pre-exposure to two similar contexts could be used as a preventive strategy 
for fear generalization. Note that we chose to pre-expose participants to two contexts that were similar to the 
conditioned context but not the conditioned context itself. We would expect that pre-exposure to the conditioned 
context and the similar context also prevents overgeneralization. However, in real life it is difficult to foresee 
the exact threatening context (i.e., before being send on a military mission). Hence, it would be more feasible to 
pre-expose an individual to contexts that resemble the context in which a traumatic event might take place.
In sum, the first aim of the study was to replicate animal findings that pre-exposure to a similar context could 
result in increased generalization in humans (Experiment 1). The second aim of the study was to investigate 
whether this overgeneralization could be restrained. Building upon insights from animal experimental research 
we investigated a preventive strategy for overgeneralization that is both neuroscience-based and non-invasive 
(Experiment 2). Finally, outside the lab, prevention is not always feasible (e.g., after trauma has taken place). 
Therefore, after pre-exposure has induced overgeneralization, strategies to reduce generalization are required. 
This could be achieved by stimulating the ability to discriminate between the conditioned context and the similar 
context at test. Insights from studies aiming to reduce overgeneralization as a result of the passage of time will be 
used to this end. Animals were conditioned in context A and tested for generalization in context B after several 
weeks. Typically, a loss of contextual features and overgeneralization to context B is observed at that time13,14. A 
return to the conditioned context A before test in B reduced generalization to that context. This reminder of the 
conditioned context recovered memory accuracy and increased the ability to discriminate between the condi-
tioned context and the similar generalization context13. Similarly, we subjected the data collected in Experiment 
2 to exploratory analyses to investigate whether a reminder of the conditioned context before generalization test 
could reduce pre-exposure-induced overgeneralization.
Experiment 1. Pre-exposure induces contextual overgeneralization in humans
Animal studies robustly demonstrated that pre-exposure to a context that is similar (but not the same or different) 
to the conditioned context enhanced generalization to that context4–6. To replicate these findings in humans, we 
employed a 3-day context-conditioning paradigm. On day 1, participants were pre-exposed to one of three con-
texts: the to-be conditioned context (context A), the similar context (context B), or the different context (context 
X). The next day (day 2) context conditioning (context A) took place. Finally, test in the conditioned context 
(context A),the similar context (context B), and the different context (context X) took place on day 3. We hypoth-
esized that pre-exposure to a similar context (context B) would result in overgeneralization. This was compared 
to the effect of pre-exposure to the same context (context A) or a completely different context (context X). We 
expected that generalization from the conditioned context (context A) to the similar context (context B) would 
be enhanced when pre-exposed to the similar context. Overgeneralization would be evidenced by an absence 
of a difference between responding in the conditioned context and the similar context on test. In contrast, we 
expected discrimination between the conditioned context and the similar context when pre-exposed to the same 
(context B) or a different context (X).
To rule out that pre-exposure per se is not sufficient to enhance generalization, participants were also tested in 
context X. We did not expect that pre-exposure to the different context (context X) would enhance generalization 
to context X on test, given that similarity between the pre-exposure and conditioned context is crucial for over-
generalization4–6. Finally, we hypothesized that overgeneralization as a result of pre-exposure to a similar context 
B is restricted to that context. Previous animal studies showed that the pre-exposure representation becomes 
specifically linked with shock during conditioning and therefore generalization to a different context was not 
observed4. Hence, we expect that pre-exposure to a similar context would not result in overgeneralization to the 
different context X.
Methods and Materials
Participants. Forty-two (24 female; 18 male) healthy undergraduate students participated in the study, rang-
ing in age between 18 and 25 years (M = 21.24, SD = 1.50). Participants received either partial course credit or 
a small amount of money (32 euros) for their participation. All participants gave informed consent and were 
notified that they could withdraw from participation at any time. The experimenter briefly screened the partic-
ipants to assure they were free from a physical (i.e., heart disease or epilepsy) or psychiatric disorder. The study 
was approved by and in accordance with the guidelines of the Ethics Committee of the University of Amsterdam. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the pre-exposure A (n = 14), pre-exposure B (n = 14), or the pre-exposure 
X (n = 13) condition. Of these participants, two (pre-exposure X condition) were excluded from analysis of day 2 
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FPS responding due to technical difficulties. One participant (pre-exposure A condition) was excluded from all 
analysis due to technical difficulties.
Apparatus. Stimuli. Participants were presented different areas of a house. A floor plan of the house was 
presented before and throughout the experiment. The contextual stimuli were static images of different rooms and 
a garden of a house (Fig. 1a,b). Two living room images served as context A and B, whereas an image of the garden 
served as context X. The living room images (context A and B) shared common features: the floor and the wall 
were the same for context A and B, as was the point of view of the living room images. Differences between the 
rooms consisted of furniture and different locations on the floor plan. There was no overlap in features between 
the living rooms and the garden (context X), which was located next to the house on the floor plan. Context A 
served as the threatening context (i.e., conditioned context), context B as the similar context and context X as 
the context completely different from the threatening context. An additional context served as context control, 
consisting of an image of a hallway. Assignment of the living room images as context A or B was counterbalanced 
across all participants. A floor plan of the house was shown at the beginning of the experiment. The contextual 
stimuli and the floor plan were created by interior designing programs (www.roomstyler.com; www.floorplanner.
com). Stimulus presentation was controlled by Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, www.neurobs.
com).
Unconditioned stimulus. The US was a 2ms electrocutaneous stimulus administered to the wrist of the left hand. 
Electrical stimulation was delivered through a pair of Ag electrodes of 20 by 25 mm with a fixed inter-electrode 
mid-distance of 45 mm. Shock were delivered by a Digitimer DS7A constant current stimulator (Hertfordshire, 
UK). Between the electrodes and the skin a conductive gel (Signa, Parker) was applied15–18.
Fear potentiated startle (FPS). Startle response was measured through electromyography (EMG) of the right 
orbicularis oculi muscle. Two 6 mm sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with a conductive gel (Signa, Parker) 
were positioned approximately 1 cm under the pupil and 1 cm below the lateral canthus, respectively; a ground 
electrode was placed on the forehead, 1 cm below hairline19. The startle probe was a 40ms duration noise burst 
(104 dB) with a rise/fall time shorter than 1ms, which was presented binaurally through headphones (Sennheiser, 
model HD 25-1 II). The EMG signal was amplified in two stages. The input stage had an input resistance of 10 
MOhm, a frequency response of DC-1500 Hz and an amplification factor of 200. The bandwidth of the EMG 
channels was set to 1500 Hz to maintain optimal time accuracy in the onset and offset of the EMG response. 
Because the signal power in the frequency range from 400–1000 Hz is very low20, aliasing effects due to the low 
sample frequency are negligible. An online 50 Hz notch filter was used to reduce interference of the mains noise. 
The second stage amplified the signal with a variable amplification factor of 0–100 x. The raw EMG signal was 
sampled at 1000 Hz. The data was band-pass filtered (28–500 Hz, Butterworth, 4th order19) offline. The high-pass 
filter (28 Hz/4th order) was applied to remove movement artefacts and baseline fluctuation caused by electrode 
offsets, resulting in a very low resting state EMG level that remained constant during the experiment. Due to 
this low baseline level baseline correction was unnecessary and instead absolute values were used to reduce the 
Figure 1. Overview of stimuli and experimental procedure for Experiment 1. Contextual stimuli (a), floor plan 
of the house (b), and schematic representation of the experimental design (c).
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negative effect of for example short eye blinks occurring just before stimulus onset. After rectifying and contour 
following (time constant = 10 ms) the peak amplitude was found by analysing the first derivative of the resulting 
signal in a 30–150 ms interval following probe onset.
Online US-expectancy ratings. Participants rated their US-expectancy online on an 11-point scale ranging from 
‘certainly no electric stimulus’ (−5) through ‘uncertain’ (0) to ‘certainly an electric stimulus’ (5). The scale was 
placed at the bottom of the screen. US-expectancy was rated continuously throughout the 2 min of context pres-
entation. Ratings were recorded at a rate of 2 samples per second. US-expectancy levels were rated by shifting the 
cursor on the scale with use of the mouse throughout the context presentation (no button presses). Subjects were 
not informed about contingencies and were instructed to update their US-expectancy throughout context pres-
entation by moving the cursor or leaving it in place, as long as the position on the scale resembled their current 
expectancy.
Subjective assessments. State and trait anxiety was measured with the Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T)21. 
Evaluation of the US was assessed on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘unpleasant’ (−5) to ‘pleasant’ (5).
Procedure. The experiment consisted of a pre-exposure, conditioning, and test session on three consecutive 
days. For a schematic representation of the experimental design see Fig. 1c. Every test session started with ten 
startle noise alone (NA) trials to stabilize baseline startle reactivity. On the first testing day participants were 
screened and filled out informed consent and the trait anxiety (STAI-T) questionnaire. Next, they were seated in 
front of a computer screen in a sound-attenuated room. The EMG electrodes were attached. To create a neutral 
experience for the pre-exposure session, the US-electrodes were not attached. Consequently, US-expectancy was 
not rated on the first day of testing. Before actual presentation of the contexts participants were shown the floor 
plan of the house and were instructed that they would visit different areas of the house. While the images were 
static, we aimed to create an experience of being led through the different areas of the house. To this end, the 
floor plan was used to underline that the areas belonged to one house. Before presentation of a context image, 
the area the participant was about to see was highlighted on the floor plan and participants were instructed 
that they were about to enter a room/hallway/garden of the house. Before every context presentation the floor 
plan was shown again and the context they were about to see was highlighted. During pre-exposure participants 
were first presented the control context, followed by the pre-exposure context (block 1). This was repeated once 
(block 2), making a total of two presentations of the control context and two presentations of the pre-exposure 
context. Contextual stimuli were presented for 2 minutes. Ten seconds after context onset the first of three 
startle probes (40ms; 104 dB) during context presentation was delivered, with an inter-probe interval of 40 s. 
Participants in the pre-exposure A group were pre-exposed to the to-be threatening context; participants in the 
pre-exposure B group were pre-exposed to the context that was similar to the threatening context; participants 
in the pre-exposure X group were pre-exposed to the context that was completely different from the threatening 
context.
The next day the procedure was the same for all participants. The EMG and shock electrodes were attached 
and US-intensity level was determined by gradually increasing shock intensity (starting at 1 mA) until partic-
ipants indicated the shock to be ‘uncomfortable though not painful’. Participants did not receive information 
about the relationship between the contexts and the US. Expectancy was rated throughout presentation of the 
context. They were instructed to continuously place the cursor of the mouse on the position on the scale corre-
sponding to their US-expectancy, ranging from ‘certainly no electric stimulus’ (−5) through ‘uncertain’ (0) to 
‘certainly an electric stimulus’ (5). First the control context was presented followed by the threatening context 
(block 1), which was repeated once (block 2). During the first presentation of the threatening context 4 USs were 
delivered at 16s, 38s, 63s, and 105s after context onset. To make US delivery as unpredictable as possible three USs 
were presented at different time points (28s, 70s, 80s after context onset) during the second threatening context 
presentation. After conclusion of the experimental phase participants rated US-pleasantness. As on day 1, startle 
probes were presented and before presentation every context was highlighted on the floor plan.
One day later participants returned for the final testing day (day 3). The EMG and shock electrodes were 
attached and participants were instructed that the experiment would be continued. Every context was presented 
once. The control context was presented first, followed by random presentation of contexts A, B, and X. Again, 
participants rated their US-expectancy, startle probes were presented and every context was highlighted on the 
floor plan before presentation. On day 3 no shocks were delivered.
It is important to note that in contrast to the animal studies4,5, but in line with human context condition-
ing studies22,23, we employed a differential conditioning paradigm. This allows the demonstration of learning 
by comparing responses to the threatening context to responses in the control context. The control context was, 
thus, added to control for responding in the conditioned context (day 2 and day 3). Note that generalization was 
assessed by comparing responding in the conditioned context and the generalization contexts on day 3.
Data analysis. Startle responses were averaged for each context presentation. To control for inter-individual 
differences in startle responsiveness startle data were T-transformed. Day 2 (acquisition) US-expectancy ratings 
were averaged over the 2 min of context presentation. Day 3 (generalization test) US-expectancy ratings were 
averaged over the first 30 s of context presentation. FPS during pre-exposure on day 1 was tested with a mixed 
analysis of variance for repeated measures (ANOVA) with context (pre-exposure context; control context) and 
trial (trial 1; trial 2) as within-subjects factors; group (pre-exposure A; pre-exposure B; pre-exposure X) was 
included as between-subjects factor to demonstrate that the groups did not differ in startle responding during 
pre-exposure. US-expectancy was not measured during pre-exposure. To test acquisition of US-expectancy and 
FPS on day 2, data were subjected to a mixed ANOVA with context (context A; control context) and trial (trial 
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1; trial 2) as within-subjects factors; group (pre-exposure A; pre-exposure B; pre-exposure X) was included as 
between-subjects factor to demonstrate that the groups did not differ in acquisition. To demonstrate that differen-
tial US-expectancy ratings between the threatening context A and the control context persisted from condition-
ing (day 2) to test (day 3), and did not differ between groups, a mixed ANOVA with context (context A; control 
context) and trial (last acquisition trial day 2; test trial day 3) as within-subjects factors and group (pre-exposure 
A; pre-exposure B; pre-exposure X) as between-subjects factor was performed.
Further analyses were performed for both US-expectancy and FPS responding. To test for differences between 
groups in generalization from the conditioned context A to the similar context B on day 3 a mixed ANOVA 
with group (pre-exposure A; pre-exposure B; pre-exposure X) as between-subjects factor and context (context 
A; context B) as within-subjects factor was performed. Following up on a significant interaction with group, 
paired-samples t-tests (context A vs. context B) were performed for the groups separately. To test for general-
ization from the conditioned context A to the different context X on day 3, the same analyses were performed 
replacing context B with context X. The alpha level was set at 0.05 for statistical analyses. A Greenhouse-Geisser 
procedure was used in case of violation of the sphericity assumption in ANOVAs.
Data availability. The programmed experiment (including stimulus materials) and the datasets ana-
lysed during the current study are available in the Open Science Framework (OSF) repository, https://osf.
io/2dcp4/?view_only=05f27542f4144497893f2c94453b3857.
Results
Participants. There were no differences in US-intensity, US-evaluation and reported state and trait anxiety 
(Fs < 1) between the groups (Table 1).
US-expectancy ratings. For analyses on differential responding between the threatening context and the 
control context during conditioning (day 2) and test (day 3) see Supplementary materials.
Generalization to the similar context (context B). Analyses revealed differences between groups in differential 
ratings to conditioned context A and the similar context B (context x group; F(2, 38) = 7.97, p < 0.001, η²p = 0.30) 
(Fig. 2a–c). Follow-up analyses showed overgeneralization when pre-exposed to the similar context B, evidenced 
by an absence of differences in ratings to context A and B in the pre-exposure B group (t(13) = 1.19, p = 0.26, 
d = 0.33) (Fig. 2b). In contrast, there were higher US-expectancy ratings in the conditioned context compared to 
the similar context B in both pre-exposure A group (t(13) = 6.12, p < 0.001, d = 1.70) (Fig. 2a) and pre-exposure 
X group (t(12) = 5.14, p < 0.001, d = 1.77) (Fig. 2c). Hence, in line with our expectations we observed overgener-
alization from the conditioned context to the similar context in those participants that were pre-exposed to the 
similar context B (pre-exposure B condition). Those participants pre-exposed to a context that was the same 
Pre-exposure A Pre-exposure B Pre-exposure X
US-intensity (mA) 23.4 (10.9) 19.2 (12.5) 19.0 (11.2)
US-evaluation −2.6 (2.1) −2.78 (0.8) −2.5 (1.3)
State anxiety 32.7 (6.2) 31.8 (7.1) 30.5 (7.1)
Trait anxiety 35.6 (7.4) 37.9 (10.8) 34.1 (6.3)
Table 1. Mean values (SD) of the US-intensity, US-evaluation, state anxiety (STAI-S), and trait anxiety (STAI-T) 
for the pre-exposure A (n = 14), pre-exposure B (n = 14), and pre-exposure X (n = 13) groups.
Figure 2. Pre-exposure to a similar context enhances generalization of US-expectancy. Mean US-expectancy 
ratings to context A, context B, and context X on test (day 3) for the pre-exposure A (n = 14) (a), pre-exposure B 
(n = 14) (b), and pre-exposure X (n = 13) (c) conditions. Error bars represent s.e.m.
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(pre-exposure A condition) or completely different (pre-exposure X condition) from the conditioned context 
showed good discrimination between the conditioned context and the similar context at test.
Generalization to the different context (context X). Contrary to expectation, analyses showed differences between 
groups in generalization of US-expectancy ratings from conditioned context A to the different context X (context 
x group; F(2, 38) = 5.63, p < 0.007, η²p = 0.23) (Fig. 2a–c). To further investigate this unexpected effect, follow-up 
ANOVA’s were performed, comparing the groups to one another. There was reduced discrimination between the 
contexts (A and X) when comparing the pre-exposure A and pre-exposure B groups (context x group; F(1, 26) = 
7.37, p < 0.012, η²p = 0.22). Similarly, there was reduced discrimination between the contexts when compar-
ing the pre-exposure B and pre-exposure X groups (context x group; F(1, 25) = 10.19, p < 0.004, η²p = 0.29). The 
pre-exposure A and pre-exposure X groups did not differ (context x group; F(1, 25) < 1, p = 0.63, η²p = 0.01). 
Participants in the pre-exposure A group (t(13) = 5.70, p < 0.001, d = 1.58) (Fig. 2a), in the pre-exposure B group 
(t(13) = 2.57, p = 0.023, d = 0.71) (Fig. 2b), and in the pre-exposure X group (t(12) = 6.15, p < 0.001, d = 1.77) 
(Fig. 2c) showed higher ratings to the conditioned context compared to the different context X.
Hence, US-expectancy was elevated in the conditioned context relative to the different context on test across 
all conditions. However, contrary to previous findings4, we did observe overgeneralization when pre-exposed to 
the similar context.
Fear potentiated startle (FPS). Unexpected differences in startle responding during pre-exposure made 
interpretation of the day 2 and day 3 startle data difficult (see Supplementary materials).
Conclusion Experiment 1. In line with expectation, pre-exposure to the similar context (context B) facil-
itated generalization of US-expectancy to that context. Those pre-exposed to the threatening context (A) or a 
completely different context (X) showed good discrimination of US-expectancy between the conditioning context 
and the similar context on test. It is important to note that pre-exposure itself did not facilitate generalization, as 
US-expectancy in context X was not enhanced when pre-exposed to context X; as shown by previous studies, an 
overlap between contexts is a prerequisite for increased generalization. Contrary to expectation, we did observe 
overgeneralization of US-expectancy to the different context (context X) when pre-exposed to the similar context 
B. Thus, pre-exposure to the similar context not only resulted in overgeneralization to that context but also to a 
different context.
In sum, in the first experiment we demonstrated that pre-exposure to a similar context before conditioning 
enhanced generalization of US-expectancy to a similar and a different context. In the second experiment we will 
investigate how to restrain overgeneralization.
Experiment 2. Preventing and reducing fear generalization in humans. In experiment 1 
pre-exposure to a similar context promoted generalization to other contexts. Animal studies demonstrated that 
during conditioning the representation of the similar context is also retrieved, resulting in overgeneralization to 
that context4–6. Hence, if we would be able to prevent retrieval of the pre-exposure representation during condi-
tioning, the increase in generalization would not occur. We aimed to stimulate the ability to discriminate between 
similar contexts during pre-exposure. Then, instead of recall of the pre-exposure representation during condi-
tioning, discrimination between the pre-exposure context and the conditioned context would occur, thereby 
preventing overgeneralization.
In the second experiment, participants were pre-exposed either to two similar contexts (contexts B and C) or 
to the similar and the different context (contexts B and X). We hypothesized that pre-exposure to two similar con-
text (contexts B and C) would prevent overgeneralization (Experiment 2). We expected discrimination between 
the conditioned context A and the generalization contexts B and X when pre-exposed to two similar contexts 
(context B and C). Furthermore, we hypothesized that pre-exposure to one similar and one different context 
(contexts B and X) would not prevent the increase in generalization.
Hence, in the group in which participants were pre-exposed to a similar and a different context we expected 
to still observe overgeneralization. We therefore also investigated whether, if not prevented, overgeneralization 
could be reduced. We hypothesized that a reminder of the conditioned context would enhance discrimination 
between the conditioned context and the generalization contexts. To this end, test order on day 3 was manipu-
lated, such that half of the participants were first tested in the conditioned context A (Reminder), and half of the 
participants were first tested in the similar context B (No reminder). Post-hoc analyses were performed to investi-
gate whether test order affects generalization. When pre-exposed to a similar and different context (pre-exposure 
BX group), we expected higher ratings in the conditioned context compared to the generalization contexts when 
participants were first tested in the conditioned context (Reminder); we expected to still observe overgenerali-
zation when first tested in the similar context (No reminder). Finally, we expected that, regardless of test order, 
discrimination will be observed when pre-exposed to two similar contexts. That is, in the pre-exposure BC group 
we expected higher responding in the conditioning context compared to the generalization contexts both when 
first tested in the conditioned context (Reminder) and when first tested in the similar context (No reminder).
Methods and Materials
Participants. Participants (n = 34; 28 female, 6 male) were healthy undergraduate students, who ranged in 
age between 19 and 26 years (M = 22.41, SD = 1.88). For participation they received either partial course credit 
or a small amount of money (24 euros). All participants gave informed consent and were informed that they 
could withdraw from participation at any time. The experimenter briefly screened the participants to assure they 
were free from any contraindication for the study (see Experiment 1). The study was approved and in accord-
ance with the guidelines of the Ethics Committee of the KULeuven. Participants were randomly assigned to 
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the pre-exposure BC (n = 17) or the pre-exposure BX (n = 17) group. Due to technical difficulties startle data 
from two of these participants on day 2 (pre-exposure BX condition) and startle data from one subject on day 3 
(pre-exposure BX condition) were excluded from analysis.
Apparatus. Stimuli. We used the same images as contexts A, B, and X and created an additional context C 
and a new image of the hallway (Fig. 3a,b). The same living room images served as context A and B, and the same 
image of the garden served as context X. A newly created living room image served as context C. The floor plan of 
the house was adjusted accordingly (www.floorplanner.com). Context A served as the threatening context; con-
text B and context C as the similar contexts and context X as the context completely different from the threatening 
context. Again, the control stimulus consisted of an image of a hallway. In the previous experiment we observed 
enhanced startle responding to the control context during pre-exposure. The observation that darkness facilitates 
the startle response24 could explain this effect, given that the control stimulus was darker than the other stimuli. 
For the current experiment we designed a new control context image. Assignment of the living room images as 
context A, B, or C was counterbalanced across all participants. Stimulus presentation was controlled by Affect4 
software designed at the University of Leuven (free download25).
Unconditioned Stimulus. The US was a 2ms electrocutaneous stimulus administered to the wrist of the left hand. 
Electrical stimulation was delivered through a pair of surface Sensormedics electrodes (10 mm diameter) filled 
with K-Y gel with inter-electrode mid-distance of 45 mm. Shock deliverance was controlled by a Digitimer DS7A 
constant current stimulator (Hertfordshire, UK)26.
Fear potentiated startle (FPS). Startle response was measured through electromyography (EMG) of the right 
orbicularis oculi muscle. Two Ag/AgCl sensormedics electrodes (2.5 mm diameter) filled with TECA electrolyte 
gel were positioned approximately 1 cm under the pupil and 1 cm below the lateral canthus, respectively; a ground 
electrode was placed on the forehead, 1 cm below hairline19. The startle probe was a 50ms duration noise burst 
(100 dB) with instantaneous rise time presented binaurally through headphones. The raw signal was amplified by 
a Coulbourn isolated bioamplifier with a bandpass filter (v75-04) to reduce interference from other recorded sig-
nals (SCR). The recording bandwidth of the EMG signal was between 10 Hz and 20 kHz (plusminus 3 dB). Signal 
measuring for startle presentation was 1500 ms, starting 500 ms before probe onset. The EMG signal was digitized 
at 1000 Hz. The signal was rectified online and smoothed by Coulbourn multifunction integrator (v76-23 A) 
with a time constant of 50 ms. The data were band-pass filtered (13–500 Hz) online. The startle data were treated 
offline with PSPHA, a modular script based program for analysing psychophysiological data27. Peak amplitudes 
were defined as the maximum of the response curve within the 30–150 ms interval after the probe onset. Each 
peak amplitude was scored by subtracting its baseline score (=averaged EMG level between 1 and 20 ms after the 
noise probe onset).
Skin conductance level (SCL). Electrodermal activity was measured with a skin conductance coupler manu-
factured by Coulbourn Instruments (model V71-23, Allentown, PA). Two 8 mm Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with 
K-Y gel were attached to the palm of the left hand. The coupler applied a constant voltage of 0.5 V across the elec-
trodes. The resulting skin conductance signal passed through a Labmaster DMA 12 bit analog-to-digital converter 
(Scientific Solutions, Solon, Ohio) and digitized at 10 Hz from 2 s prior to context onset until 2 min after context 
onset. Skin conductance level was determined at 0.5 s intervals, both in the −2 to 0 s baseline window and the 
Figure 3. Overview of stimuli and experimental procedure for Experiment 2. Contextual stimuli (a), floor plan 
of the house (b), and schematic representation of the experimental design (c).
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0–10 s window after context onset. Scores for the entire-interval response (EIR) for this window were calculated 
by subtracting the mean SCL for the 2 s baseline immediately preceding context onset from the highest SCL value 
recorded during the 0–10 s window after context onset28. Note that in the 0–10 s window after context onset no 
startle probes and USs were delivered.
Online US-expectancy. Continuous online US-expectancy was measured throughout the experiment (for details 
see Experiment 1).
Procedure. The procedure was the same as described for Experiment 1, except for pre-exposure on day 1 
(Fig. 3c). Instead of pre-exposure to one context (A, B, or X) participants were now pre-exposed to two similar 
contexts (B and C) or to two contexts of which one was similar and the other different from the threatening con-
text (B and X). Every context (B, C/X, control) was presented once per block (total of three blocks). The control 
context was presented first, followed by random presentation of the other two contexts. In Experiment 1 startle 
probes were delivered with a fixed interval. Previous studies used varying intervals for startle probe presentation 
to prevent fast habituation of the startle response26,29. Therefore, in the current experiment there were three dif-
ferent intervals for startle probe presentation26. Probes were delivered at 33, 50, 90 s or 10, 53, 115 s or 48, 60, 100 s 
after context onset. Assignment of startle presentation protocol during each context was random. On day 3 partic-
ipants were assigned to one of two test orders: control, A, X, B or control, B, X, A. Thus with test order control, A, 
X, B participants received a reminder of the conditioned context before test in the generalization contexts. With 
test order control, B, X, A the participants were not reminded of the conditioned context but immediately tested 
in the generalization contexts. No shocks were delivered on the third day of testing. Note that additional context 
C was not tested on day 3. While we expected that pre-exposure effects on generalization to context C would not 
differ from effects to context B, we did not test this hypothesis. For sake of experimental rigor we included the 
same contexts on test as featured in Experiment 1.
Data analysis. Participants were classified as non-responders when SCL on more than 75% of trials was 
below 0.1 (n = 4). This resulted in n = 16 participants in the pre-exposure BC group and n = 14 participants 
in the pre-exposure BX group for SCR analyses. SCR outliers (0.03%) were identified and removed based on 
within-participants Z-scores (Z > 2.5). SCR was mean corrected, to equalize the opportunity for each subject to 
contribute to the group mean30. The mean value used for correction was based on the all pre-exposure, condi-
tioning and test trials. FPS data were T-transformed to control for inter-individual differences in startle respon-
siveness. Startle responses were averaged for each context presentation. US-expectancy ratings on day 2 and day 3 
were averaged over the 2 min context presentation. Analyses of US-expectancy ratings, SCR and FPS were similar 
to Study 1, but now the additional between-subjects factor test order was added to the analyses.
SCR and FPS during pre-exposure on day 1 were tested with a mixed analysis of variance for repeated meas-
ures (ANOVA) with context (pre-exposure context; control context) and trial (trial 1; trial 2) as within-subjects 
factors; group (pre-exposure BC; pre-exposure BX) was included as between-subjects factors to test for differ-
ences between groups during pre-exposure. US-expectancy was not measured during pre-exposure. To test acqui-
sition of US-expectancy, SCR, and FPS on day 2, data were subjected to a mixed ANOVA with context (context A; 
context control) and trial (trial 1; trial 2) as within-subjects factors; group (pre-exposure BC; pre-exposure BX) 
was included as between-subjects factors to test for differences in acquisition. To demonstrate that differential 
US-expectancy ratings between the conditioned context A and the control context persisted from acquisition (day 
2) to test (day 3) a mixed ANOVA with context (context A; control context) and trial (last acquisition trial day 
2; test trial day 3) as within-subjects factors and group (pre-exposure BC; pre-exposure BX) as between-subjects 
factors and was performed.
Further analyses were performed for US-expectancy, SCR, and FPS. To test whether generalization from 
the conditioned context A to the similar context B on day 3 differed between groups a mixed ANOVA with 
context (context A; context B) as within-subjects factor and group (pre-exposure BC; pre-exposure BX) as 
between-subjects factors was performed. Following up on a significant interaction with group paired-samples 
t-tests were performed to compare responding in context A with responding in the context B in the two groups 
separately. To test generalization from the conditioned context A to the different context X, the same analyses 
were performed with context X instead of context B.
Finally, post-hoc analyses to investigate the effect of test order on overgeneralization were conducted. To this 
end, test order was added as between subjects factor; a mixed ANOVA with context (context A; context B) as 
within-subjects factor and group (pre-exposure BC; pre-exposure BX) and test order (Reminder; No reminder) 
as between-subjects factors was performed. Following up on a significant interaction between group and test 
order, paired-samples t-tests comparing responding to context A and B were performed in the groups separately 
(pre-exposure BC-Reminder; pre-exposure BC-No reminder; pre-exposure BX-Reminder; pre-exposure BX-No 
reminder). The same analyses were performed to investigate generalization from the conditioned context A to the 
different context X, replacing context B with context X. The alpha level was set at 0.05 for statistical analyses. A 
Greenhouse-Geisser procedure was used in case of violation of the sphericity assumption in ANOVAs.
Data availability. The programmed experiment (including stimulus materials) and the datasets ana-
lysed during the current study are available in the Open Science Framework (OSF) repository, https://osf.
io/2dcp4/?view_only=05f27542f4144497893f2c94453b3857.
Results
Participants. There were no differences in US-intensity and US-evaluation (Fs < 1.05). There was a trend 
difference in reported trait anxiety (F(1, 33) = 3.17, p = 0.085). Note that state anxiety did not differ between the 
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groups(F(1, 33) < 2.22) (Table 2). For analyses on differential responding (US-expectancy, SCR, and FPS) between 
the conditioned context and control context during conditioning (day 2) and test (day 3) see Supplementary 
materials. For analyses of SCR and FPS during pre-exposure see Supplementary materials.
US-expectancy. Generalization to the similar context (context B). Differential ratings to the threat-
ening context (context A) and the similar context B were greater in the pre-exposure BC group compared to 
the pre-exposure BX group (context x group; F(1, 32) = 5.01, p < 0.032, η²p = 0.14) (Fig. 4a,b). This indicates, 
in line with our expectations, that there was less generalization in those pre-exposed to two similar contexts 
(pre-exposure BC) relative to those pre-exposed to a similar and a different context (pre-exposure BX). Analyzing 
the groups separately showed that ratings to the conditioned context were higher than ratings to the similar con-
text in the pre-exposure BC group (t(16) = 11.04, p < 0.001, d > 2) (Fig. 4a). Hence, as expected there was good 
discrimination when pre-exposed to the similar contexts. Finally, contrary to expectation, there was also higher 
US-expectancy in the conditioned context compared to the similar context and in the pre-exposure BX group 
(t(16) = 2.81, p = 0.013, d = 0.68) (Fig. 4b). Thus, while discrimination between contexts was more pronounced in 
the pre-exposure BC group, discrimination was also observed in the BX group.
Generalization to the different context (context X). Discrimination between the conditioned context and the dif-
ferent context X was increased in the pre-exposure BC group compared to the pre-exposure BX group (context x 
group; F(1, 32) = 4.71, p < 0.037, η²p = 0.13) (Fig. 4a,b). Analyzing the groups separately showed that ratings to the 
conditioned context were higher than ratings to the different context in the pre-exposure BC group (t(16) = 14.00, 
p < 0.001, d > 2) (Fig. 4a) and in the pre-exposure BX group (t(16) = 3.66, p = 0.002, d = 0.89) (Fig. 4b). Thus, 
pre-exposure to two similar contexts resulted in more pronounced discrimination between contexts, while dis-
crimination could also be observed when pre-exposed to two different contexts.
Similar to experiment 1, overgeneralization to the similar and the different context was still observed when 
participants were pre-exposed to a similar and a different context. However, this increase in generalization was 
prevented by pre-exposure to two similar contexts (B and C).
Skin conductance response (SCR). Test. The groups did not differ in generalization of SCR from the 
conditioned context to the similar context B on test (context × group; F(1, 26) < 1, p = 0.89, η²p = 0.00). Overall, 
there was higher responding to the conditioned context compared to the generalization context B (t(27) = 3.33, 
p = 0.003, d = 0.63) (Fig. 5a). There was a trend for a difference between groups in generalization of SCR from 
the conditioned context to the different context X on test (context x group; F(1, 26) = 3.63, p < 0.07, η²p = 0.12). 
Pre-exposure BC Pre-exposure BX
US-intensity (mA) 15.5 (8.3) 12.4 (9.5)
US-evaluation −2.5 (1.8) −2.5 (0.9)
State anxiety 29.9 (6.3) 33.3 (7.0)
Trait anxiety 32.8 (8.6) 37.4 (6.2)
Table 2. Mean values (SD) of the US-intensity, US-evaluation, state anxiety (STAI-S), and trait anxiety (STAI-T) 
for the pre-exposure BC (n = 17) and the pre-exposure BX (n = 17) conditions.
Figure 4. Pre-exposure to two similar contexts prevents enhanced generalization of US-expectancy. Mean US-
expectancy ratings to context A, context B, and context X on test (day 3) for the pre-exposure BC (n = 17) (a) 
and the pre-exposure BX (n = 17) (b) conditions. Error bars represent s.e.m.
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Responding to the conditioned context was higher than responding to the different context X (t(27) = 4.32, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.82) (Fig. 5a).
Fear potentiated startle (FPS). Test. The groups did not differ in generalization of FPS from the condi-
tioned context to the similar context B on test (context x group; F(1, 31) < 1, p = 0.76, η²p = 0.00). Also, there was 
no difference between groups in generalization from the conditioned context to the different context X on test 
(context x group; F(1, 31) < 1, p = 0.58, η²p = 0.01). In general, startle responding to the conditioned context was 
higher than responding in the similar context B (t(32) = 2.91, p = 0.006, d = 0.51) (Fig. 5b). Finally, responding 
in the conditioned context was higher than responding in the different context X on test (t(32) = 3.27, p = 0.003, 
d = 0.57) (Fig. 5b).
Exploratory analyses. Overgeneralization of US-expectancy could be prevented by pre-exposure to two 
similar contexts (pre-exposure BC group). However, participants who where pre-exposed to a similar and a dif-
ferent context still showed overgeneralization (pre-exposure BX group). Here, we will further investigate whether 
the increase in generalization, if not prevented, could be reduced by a reminder of the conditioned context. To 
this end, we will re-analyze the US-expectancy data with test order (Reminder vs. No reminder) as additional 
between-subjects factor. Note that SCR and FPS were not subjected to re-analysis. For these measures we did not 
observe any effect of pre-exposure. There was discrimination between the conditioned context and the generali-
zation contexts on test irrespective of pre-exposure. Hence, in absence of overgeneralization, there is no need for 
an improvement in discrimination between the contexts.
Test order effects on US-expectancy ratings. Generalization to the similar context (context B). 
Analysis revealed an interaction between context, group and test order (F(1, 30) = 4.36, p < 0.045, η²p = 0.13). 
Follow-up analyses were performed to compare differential ratings to the conditioned context and the simi-
lar context for the groups separately. In line with expectations, there was higher responding to the conditioned 
context compared to the similar context in the pre-exposure BC group (Fig. 6a,c), both when participants were 
reminded of the conditioned context (pre-exposure BC-reminder) (t(9) = 11.11, p < 0.001, d > 2) (Fig. 6c) and 
when participants were not reminded (pre-exposure BC-no reminder) (t(6) = 5.17, p = 0.002, d = 1.97) (Fig. 6a). 
Hence, pre-exposure to two similar contexts was already sufficient to reduce generalization to the similar context. 
In contrast, when pre-exposed to two different contexts, there was no discrimination between contexts when 
first tested in the similar generalization context (pre-exposure BX-no reminder) (t(6) = −0.06, p = 0.96, d = 0.02) 
(Fig. 6b). Only in those participants that were reminded of the conditioned context did we observe discrimination 
between the contexts on test (pre-exposure BX-reminder) (t(9) = 9.58, p < 0.001, d > 2) (Fig. 6d). Thus, overgener-
alization as a result of pre-exposure was reversed by a reminder of the conditioned context.
Generalization to the different context (context X). There was no interaction with test order for gen-
eralization to the different context (context x test order; context × group × test order; Fs(1, 30) < 1, ps > 0.35, 
η²p < 0.03). Note that when analysing the four groups separately, we observed a pattern of responding that is 
similar to generalization to the similar context (see section above). Ratings to the conditioned context A were 
higher than ratings to the different context X in those pre-exposed to the two similar contexts (pre-exposure 
BC group) (Fig. 6a,c) both when reminded of the conditioned context (pre-exposure BC-reminder) (t(9) = 8.13, 
p < 0.001, d > 2) (Fig. 6c) and when participants were not reminded (pre-exposure BC-no reminder) (t(6) = 22.27, 
p < 0.001, d > 2) (Fig. 6a). In contrast, when pre-exposed to different contexts, only the group that was reminded 
of the conditioned context showed discrimination between the conditioned context and the different context 
X (pre-exposure BX-reminder) (t(9) = 4.76, p < 0.001, d = 1.51) (Fig. 6d). In the group that was not reminded, 
there was no discrimination between the contexts (pre-exposure BX-No reminder) (t(6) = 1.31, p = 0.24, d = 0.49) 
(Fig. 6b). Hence, we still observed overgeneralization to the different context X when not reminded of the condi-
tioned context. The increase in generalization was reduced by a reminder.
Figure 5. Pre-exposure does not affect skin conductance response (SCR) or fear potentiated startle (FPS). Mean 
skin conductance response (a) and mean startle response (b) to context A, context B, and context X on test (day 
3). In absence of group differences, responses in the pre-exposure BC and pre-exposure BX groups are averaged 
(n = 33). Error bars represent s.e.m.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 1SCiEntifiC REPORtS | 7: 16967  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-16893-2
Conclusion experiment 2. Overgeneralization of US-expectancy ratings to the similar context could be pre-
vented and was not observed when pre-exposed to two similar contexts (pre-exposure BC group). Furthermore, 
overgeneralization of US-expectancy was still present in those pre-exposed to the similar and different context 
(pre-exposure BX group) but could be reduced by a reminder of the conditioned context. Again, we observed a 
pattern of responding for generalization to the different context that follows that of generalization to the similar 
context. Overgeneralization to the different context X was prevented by pre-exposure to two similar contexts. If it 
was not prevented (pre-exposure BX group), post-hoc analyses indicated that the increase in generalization could 
be reduced by a reminder of the conditioned context. There was no effect of pre-exposure on psychophysiological 
measures (SCR and FPS). Regardless of pre-exposure, there was good discrimination between the conditioned 
context and both the similar context (B) and the different context (X). Hence, generalization of SCR and FPS was 
neither enhanced, nor needed prevention/reduction.
Discussion
The current study showed that generalization of US-expectancy could be induced and restrained in humans. 
Pre-exposure to a context that was similar to the conditioned context resulted in overgeneralization of 
US-expectancy ratings. In contrast, pre-exposing participants to two contexts that were similar to the conditioned 
context prevented increased generalization of US-expectancy. Increased generalization of contextual fear was no 
longer observed. Promisingly, once overgeneralization was induced by pre-exposure we were able to regain mem-
ory accuracy. A reminder of the conditioned context reduced increased generalization of US-expectancy ratings.
Notably, pre-exposure did not affect generalization of skin conductance response or fear potentiated startle. 
The dissociation in underlying neural mechanisms might explain these differences. Startle responding is mediated 
by the amygdala31,32, while declarative memory (US-expectancy) is thought to be largely dependent on the hip-
pocampus33,34, the structure that is also known to be responsible for pattern completion (the ability to recall mem-
ories from partial cues)35,36. A memory representation adapts more easily to small changes in the environment 
Figure 6. A reminder of the conditioning context reduces enhanced generalization. Mean US-expectancy 
ratings to context A, context B, and context X on test (day 3) for the pre-exposure BC (two similar contexts) and 
pre-exposure BX (similar and different contexts) groups separated for test order. For those first tested in context 
B (No reminder) this resulted in n = 7 in the pre-exposure BC (a) and n = 7 participants in the pre-exposure BX 
(b) conditions. For those first tested in context A (Reminder) this resulted in n = 10 in the pre-exposure BC (c) 
and n = 10 participants in the pre-exposure BX (d) groups. Error bars represent s.e.m.
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when it relies on the hippocampal circuitry and pattern completion processes. When behaviour depends on 
extra-hippocampal areas (i.e., fear potentiated startle), it is more conservative about change. This might explain 
the dissociation in results between hippocampal-dependent US-expectancy ratings and the amygdala-mediated 
startle response. Note that the underlying mechanisms of SCR remain relatively unknown. In contrast to the 
current findings, it is often observed that SCR runs parallel to the contingencies37.
A previous animal study showed that pre-exposure techniques could be used to prevent generalization9. 
Generalization of contextual fear typically increases over time, due to a decay of contextual details (recently this 
was also observed in humans23). The representation of the conditioned context degrades and it becomes more 
difficult to discriminate between the conditioned context and a similar context. To prevent the increase in gen-
eralized fear a stronger representation of the conditioned context was induced by repeatedly pre-exposing the 
animals to this context. Indeed, this pre-exposure training prevented the time-induced enhanced generalization 
to the similar context9. While the current study also demonstrated that pre-exposure could be used to prevent 
overgeneralization, there is an important difference between the studies. In the study by Biedenkapp and Rudy 
(2007) pre-exposure established a stronger representation of the conditioned context, which increased the ability 
to discriminate between that context and a similar context at test. The prevention procedure in the current study 
was designed in the first place to increase the ability to differentiate between similar contexts during conditioning 
- and not test -, such that the similar representation was not recalled. As a consequence, this resulted in differenti-
ation between the contexts on test. In contrast, the treatment strategy explored in Experiment 2 specifically aimed 
to increase differentiation on test. Prevention of recall of the pre-exposure context during conditioning was no 
longer possible, but a reminder of the conditioned context increased discrimination between contexts.
In a different line of research, pre-exposure has been employed to affect conditioning38,39. Animal studies 
showed that pre-exposure to the threatening context retards the development of conditioning, a phenomenon 
known as latent inhibition. To our knowledge there have been only two studies conducted on latent inhibition of 
contextual conditioning in humans. One study did not find an effect of context pre-exposure22, while the other 
study revealed only a very preliminary latent inhibition effect23. In the current study there was no evidence of 
latent inhibition given that conditioning or retention of conditioning (from day 2 to day 3) did not differ when 
participants were pre-exposed to the conditioned context (pre-exposure A condition) compared to the partic-
ipants in the other groups (Experiment 1). It has been suggested that only long lasting pre-exposure sessions 
attenuate context conditioning40, explaining the lack of an effect in the current study. Note that this explanation 
is hard to reconcile with the study by Biedenkapp and Rudy (2007) that showed that repeated pre-exposure to the 
to-be conditioned context prevented overgeneralization over time but did affect conditioning itself.
In the current study increased generalization was inferred from an absence of differential US-expectancies 
between the conditioned context and generalization context B on test. Visual inspection suggests that this over-
generalization does not necessarily go together with an overall increase in US-expectancy. These findings are 
in line with a series of studies on cued fear conditioning and overgeneralization3,41–43. In these studies it was 
demonstrated that patients suffering from different anxiety pathologies showed flattened generalization gradients 
relative to healthy controls. While it was not tested, a pattern of reduced responding to the threatening stimulus 
and increased responding to the safety stimulus can be observed across studies. Thus, similar to the current 
study, overgeneralization is characterized by reduced discrimination rather than an overall increase in respond-
ing. Furthermore, due to overgeneralization more stimuli become predictive of the aversive consequence (i.e., 
not only the conditioned context but also the similar context). In absence of a single predictor, it is plausible that 
confidence of the contingencies is reduced. Indeed, participants indicated to be less sure about the conditioned 
context as a predictor of the US at test.
The reduction in responding to the conditioned context may also explain the unexpected finding of overgen-
eralization to the different context. A previous animal study showed that recall of pre-exposure context during 
conditioning results in a specific link of the recalled representation and shock that does not extend to a completely 
different context4. Alternatively, our results could suggest that rather than establishing a specific link between the 
retrieved pre-exposure context and shock4–6, recall of the pre-exposure context during conditioning resulted in 
a more generic memory representation of the conditioned context. Thus, instead of two separate representations 
that are associated with shock, the two representations blended into a single representation. Then, loss of specific 
features of the threatening context might have facilitated generalization to less similar contexts.
From a clinical point of view, the current study demonstrates that anxiety is not restricted to stimuli present 
during trauma. Here, we show that overgeneralization, a robust marker of anxiety pathology1–3, could already 
be induced in healthy participants by means of their previous experiences. Promisingly, we were able to prevent 
increased generalization by pre-exposure to multiple contexts that were similar to the conditioned context. This 
is an encouraging first step towards the development of effective techniques to prevent fear generalization. Such 
interventions might be used in those groups in which traumatic experiences are likely to occur. Otherwise, after 
a fear-learning event interventions aimed at reducing generalization should be applied.
In conclusion, this study showed that pre-exposure could result in contextual overgeneralization of 
US-expectancy. But we offered two different strategies to curb overgeneralization. First, pre-exposure to a pair 
of similar contexts prevented increased generalization. Second, if not prevented, memory accuracy for contexts 
could be improved by a return to the conditioned context, resulting in reduced generalization of US-expectancy. 
These findings advance our insight in memory dynamics and lay a foundation for the development of interven-
tions specifically aimed at generalization reduction.
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